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In the 1980s, life insurers sold guaranteed investment contracts (GICs) to pension 
plan sponsors, then backed these contracts with portfolios heavily weighted with 
higher risk assets such as common stocks and junk bonds. Ultimately this caused 
considerable loss, and history has repeated itself in many respects in recent years via 
holdings of equities and mortgage-backed securities. We evaluate the risky asset 
substitution in the life insurance industry from an historical perspective to determine if 
organizational form or other factors might be rationale for managerial decisions to 
engage in asset substitution. We find evidence that stock insurer managers are more 
likely than their mutual counterparts to engage in this type of risky asset substitution. 
Our findings provide rich ground for future research as the subprime mortgage and 
credit default swap debacles unfold, as well as public policy implications for 
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As a group, life insurers recently have been among the hardest hit industries in the 
U.S. in terms of market valuation and financial strength. Touryalai (2009) notes an 
average loss in life insurer stock values of nearly 60% between April 2008 and 2009, 
compared to a drop of approximately 40% for the Standard and Poor’s 500 index. While 
some recovery of valuations has occurred in early-to-mid-2009, ratings downgrades and 
the poor stock performances of life insurers have left leading investment analysts and 
financial advisors leery of the industry’s future prospects (Mercado, 2009).  
One of the great concerns to regulators is the continuing decline of life insurers’ 
financial strength ratings (FSRs). Thirty-one life insurers experienced downgrades in 
their FSRs during 2008, while only eight were assigned upgrades (Touryalai, 2009). 
Downgrades in 2009 have been announced for such prominent life insurers as 
Hartford Life, ING USA Annuity and Life, Lincoln National, MetLife, Protective 
Life, and Prudential Financial, to name a few.  
Some of the more troubled life insurers have been forced to bolster their capital 
positions by turning to national governments and/or attempting to sell some of their 
key business units. For instance, ING Groep N.V. turned to the Dutch government to 
absorb 80% of their residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), but their U.S. 
subsidiaries still have substantial exposure to both residential and commercial 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) (Mirabella and Edelsberg, 2009). 
Lincoln National and Hartford Financial recently have followed an unprecedented 
strategy of buying relatively small thrift institutions just so they could access funds 
from the U.S. government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program. Potential spillover effects 
to the property-casualty industry are apparent in the case of Hartford Financial. After 
failed attempts to sell their life insurance operations, Hartford reportedly explored 
selling their core property-casualty insurance businesses, which carried higher 
financial ratings than the life subsidiaries (Greenwald, 2009a; Greenwald, 2009b).  
The woes of the life insurance industry are reminiscent of the 1991 Executive 
Life debacle, which stemmed from risky “junk” bond investments, although today’s 
industry is suffering because of investments in MBS and equities. It appears that at 
least with respect to high-risk investment behavior, history has repeated itself. What 
factors might be useful in explaining such risky behavior on the part of firms that are 
primarily in the business of reducing the financial consequences of risk for others? 
Events in the life insurance industry point to fundamental failures in asset-liability 
management by many large firms. In particular, analysts and observers cite frequent 
mismatches of long-term bonds, equities, and MBS with the variable annuity liabilities 
that often feature relatively high, short-term, guaranteed rates. By the end of 2008 such 
prominent life insurers as Allstate Life, Hartford Life, ING USA Annuity Life, John 
Hancock Life, and Security Life of Denver were reported to hold commercial MBS rated 
A or lower that exceeded total capital and surplus for each firm (Touryalai, 2009). 
Financial researchers are just beginning to explore both the impact and causes of 
the recent asset-liability management problems among U.S. life insurers. In particular, 
real-estate-related holdings, especially residential MBS, have been expanded greatly, 
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and potential ratings downgrades have been projected to greatly affect insurer 
capitalization in the future (Baranoff and Sager, 2009; Liebenberg, Colquitt, and 
Hollans, 2009). These are preliminary results at best, however, and we are unlikely to 
more fully understand both the motivations for management to mismatch assets and 
liabilities during the recent crisis and the ultimate effects until more data from 
subsequent years are available. 
In this study we take a different approach from prior researchers by looking back 
to a previous era in which managers of some life insurers may have exploited unique 
regulatory and market conditions to deliberately mismatch assets and liabilities. We 
first provide readers with a review of the literature on asset substitution and explain 
how it can pertain to life insurers. We then discuss regulatory and market conditions 
in the late 1980s that allowed insurers to actively engage in mismatching assets and 
liabilities in an effort to increase equity values. Finally, we empirically explore 
specific factors that can lead to such practices. 
 
 
Executive Life and GICs 
 
Leading up to the 1991 Executive Life insolvency, along with the insolvency of 
other insurers that had overextended their portfolios in risky assets, were historic 
changes in U.S. financial markets, including uncharacteristically high interest rates, 
heightened competition among financial institutions, development of new financial 
products, and expanded demand in the pension marketplace. Much of the increased 
demand from pension funds came from the rapid growth of 401(k) retirement plans, a 
type of defined contribution pension plan that was introduced into the U.S. tax code in 
1978.  
Between 1983 and 1988, the number of workers covered by 401(k) plans nearly 
quadrupled, bringing new money into the pension marketplace that needed to be invested. 
Life insurers, as traditional providers of investment products for the pension industry, 
were the natural suppliers for this market. Large insurers, with broad in-house expertise 
and reputations for financial stability, began to design new financial products for 
retirement plan sponsors. Among the more popular products was the guaranteed 
investment contract (GIC), which is similar to a certificate of deposit in that it has a fixed 
maturity and the issuer is obligated to repay principal and interest in a lump sum at 
maturity.  
During the 1980s the value of GICs outstanding increased from less than $5 
billion to over $150 billion, with more than 60% of all 401(k) retirement plan 
participants investing in these instruments by the end of the decade (Morris, 1990). 
GICs were attractive to pension fund managers because the suppliers of GICs tended 
to be the larger, more highly rated life insurers. These firm characteristics imparted an 
aura of safety to GICs, even though they were priced to provide yields comparable to 
intermediate-term government and corporate bonds (Walker, 1992). 
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The sale of GICs created a substantial infusion of cash to large life insurers, and 
managers faced the challenge of investing to earn returns in excess of the promised 
yields. One possibility was to buy higher risk assets such as common stocks and 
below-investment-grade bonds, popularly known as junk bonds. Short-term profits 
from such a strategy proved too lucrative for some insurance managers to ignore. By 
mid-1987, life insurers had become the largest institutional buyers of junk bonds, 
which accounted for 7.5% of admitted assets (Smyth, 1987; A. M. Best, 1992). Not all 
GIC suppliers invested in higher risk assets, however. For example, New York Life 
and Guardian Life, both issuers of GICs, eventually publicized their negligible 
holdings of junk bonds (Lublin, 1990).  
In this study, we argue that the sale of GICs and subsequent investment of 
proceeds in common stocks and junk bonds systematically increased the risk profiles 
of some insurers’ asset portfolios during the 1980s. The substitution of higher-risk 
assets for lower-risk ones is what we are referring to as asset substitution, and is first 
described in Jensen and Meckling (1976). While this strategy should not be 
dynamically consistent with limited disclosure of insurers’ asset portfolio values, new 
incentives to invest in 401(k) plans, and misinformation about junk bond risks, 
allowed managers to pursue this strategy.  
Our evidence suggests that, in such an environment, managers of stock insurers 
generally found asset substitution strategies to be more appealing than did managers of 
stock insurers. For a sample of 95 life and health insurers in 1989, our multivariate 
model indicates that managers of stock insurers maintained an incremental common 
stock and junk bond position amounting to 4.3% of total assets held. This difference 
translates to an economically significant amount exceeding $105 million worth of 
common stocks and junk bonds per stock insurer. Because GIC returns were 
approximately equal across issuers,5 our results suggest that managers of stock insurers 
were able to engage in asset substitution that potentially transferred wealth from fixed to 
residual claimants. Nine years later, when the conditions conducive to asset substitution 
should have dissipated, we find no similar evidence of asset substitution.  
Motivated by conflicting research on whether mutual-owned stock (MOS) firms 
act more like mutual or stock firms, we find some evidence that managers of MOS 
insurers issuing GICs during the late 1980s behaved similarly to mutual managers 
during the late 1980s, or maybe even a bit more conservatively. 
Our study is organized as follows. First, we discuss the implications of 
organizational forms in the insurance industry for managers’ investing policies. We 
then explore why managers of insurers were able to substitute assets during the 1980s. 
In the next section, we present our primary hypothesis and discuss other factors that 
must be considered in conducting our empirical tests. We then describe the research 
design, followed by our empirical results. In the final section, we summarize our main 
findings and offer suggestions for future study. 
 
                                            
5. See, e.g., surveys in Pensions and Investments Age of GIC rates offered by leading suppliers 
(Williams, 1989a, 1989b). 
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Organizational Form and Asset Substitution 
by Insurers 
 
Two organizational firms—the mutual firm and the stock company—dominate in 
the life insurance industry. As explained by Esty (1997) and Lee, Mayers, and Smith 
(1997), fixed and residual claims are bundled in a mutual organization, while they are 
separable in a stock firm. Residual claimants of an insurer essentially hold a call 
option. One implication of options pricing theory is that any managerial action that 
increases the volatility of firm value will increase the value of this call option while 
decreasing the value of fixed claims. Esty (1997) states that either investing in assets 
with volatile cash flows or mismatching the duration of assets and liabilities can 
accomplish this goal. In addition to Esty (1997), Staking and Babbel (1995) also 
discuss the effect of mismatched duration (and leverage) on the value of the investors’ 
call option with respect to property/casualty insurers. Consequently, residual 
claimants in stock firms can increase their wealth by providing managers with 
incentives to use the previously described techniques to increase the volatility of firm 
value. Fixed claimants therefore should expect higher contracting and monitoring 
costs and should extract a risk premium, such as a higher yield on GICs purchased.  
Because residual and fixed claims are bundled in mutuals, the claimants cannot 
expect a net gain when asset volatility is increased, and they are unlikely to give 
managers incentives to do so. This conclusion represents a natural extension of the 
managerial discretion hypothesis (Mayers and Smith, 1981), which states that mutual 
insurers will be limited to operations requiring relatively less managerial discretion 
because the residual claimants of mutuals also are fixed claimants, and they have no 
incentives to encourage higher risk activities. Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) find that 
managers of mutual insurers are less prone to increase portfolio risk around enactments 
of state guaranty fund laws, which lends support to this extension of theory.  
Our study differs from Lee, Mayers, and Smith in that we examine risk shifting in 
a naturally evolving, competitive marketplace. We contribute to the literature by 
explaining how certain market conditions and opaque accounting procedures can 
combine to create an environment in which managers are able to substitute assets. We 
then empirically test for asset substitution among insurers in such an environment and 
at a later time when the favorable conditions should have dissipated.  
We follow the rationale of Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997, p. 13) in assuming that 
common stocks generally are riskier than the other major categories of assets held by 
insurers. Another identifiable, higher risk category is that of junk bond holdings, 
which exhibit relatively high credit and liquidity risks and are typically callable, 
thereby adding interest rate risk to insurer portfolios. During the 1980s, the average 
maturity of GICs issued by insurers often was much shorter than that of the junk bond 
portfolio underlying them (Richmond, 1992). Consequently, the addition of junk 
bonds to insurer asset portfolios generally increased both the risks of cash flow 
volatility and the interest rate risk caused by asset/liability mismatching.  
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Asset substitution should not be dynamically consistent in competitive markets 
because fixed claimants will quickly realize that part of the value of their claim is 
being transferred to residual claimants and they will demand a risk premium and/or 
costly contractual protection. We argue that the confluence of several unique factors 
in the financial markets of the 1980s created opportunities both for asset substitution 
by managers and a natural experiment for researchers to test systematic relations 
between insurers’ organizational structure and the investment decisions of managers.  
 
 
Why Asset Substitutions Strategies Could 
Persist in the 1980s 
 
We posit that during the 1980s the estimates of wealth transfers by purchasers of 
products from life insurers were likely to be biased downward, thereby allowing 
managers to substitute assets for a prolonged period without suffering adverse effects 
on prices or contractual covenants. We subsequently discuss three likely factors for 
this phenomenon. 
 
Industry Disclosure Environment 
 
Although insurers filed asset portfolio data with state regulators and the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) during the 1980s, these disclosures 
were inadequate for investors to accurately assess insurer portfolio risk. For example, 
bonds listed in the required annual statements were shown at amortized rather than 
market values. While the diligent fixed claimant could convert the book value of 
bonds to market values for actively traded securities, the secondary markets for most 
bonds held by insurers often were thinly traded, making market valuation problematic. 
GIC documents provided little additional disclosure because of a no-action letter from 
the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1977 that effectively extended Section 
3(a)8 of the Securities Act of 1933 to GICs sold to tax-qualified pension and profit-
sharing plans. This decision effectively exempted GICs from the registration and 
delivery requirements typical for investment products such as mutual funds.  
Instead of direct valuation of insurers’ underlying investment portfolios, fixed 
claimants could use financial strength ratings published by private agencies. Belth 
(1982, 1990) documents an upward drift in ratings by the dominant rating agency, 
A.M. Best Company, during the 1980s; however, in 1987, the year in which junk 
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To differentiate themselves from weaker competitors, some insurers turned to more 
exclusive agencies, such as Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, but these ratings also 
tended to be inflated and were slow to adjust to financial deterioration.6  
 
New Demand for Investment-Oriented Products 
 
The Tax Reform Act of 1981 created new incentives to invest in 401(k) and other 
defined contribution plans (Ippolito, 1992).7 The 401(k) plan often became the vehicle 
of choice in the 1980s. Individual participants could select investments within these 
plans, and GICs frequently proved to be the favored, fixed-income product. Generally 
accepted accounting practices during the 1980s allowed plan sponsors to report GIC 
holdings at book rather than market values, so they did not have to explain market 
fluctuations to their presumably risk-averse participants.8 
While the demand for GICs increased in the 1980s, sponsors of defined 
contribution plans were subject to much lower fiduciary standards under various 
federal laws, including the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The most 
burdensome requirement was that sponsors deliver investment options commensurate 
with their stated risk-return qualities. Monitoring responsibilities were substantially 
shifted to the individual participants, who were likely to view themselves as 
customers rather than investors and not be as vigilant as large sponsors of defined 
benefit pensions once had been.  
 
Misinformation About Junk Bond Risks 
 
Although the junk bond market had operated since the late 1970s, sufficient data to 
allow empirical measurement of the risk-return attributes of these securities did not 
accumulate until the mid-1980s. Using data for 1977 through 1986, Blume and Keim 
(1987) found that junk bonds offered significantly higher monthly returns and lower 
variation than did investment-grade corporate and Treasury bonds. Researchers later 
noted that the comparative measures probably were biased because of improper default 
risk assessment, and better estimates of default rates eventually emerged (Altman, 1989; 
                                            
6. For example, Executive Life of California maintained junk bond holdings approaching 40% 
of admitted assets in 1990 and it ranked 13th among life insurers in GIC sales. The insurer was rated 
A+ by Best, AAA by S&P, and A1 by Moody’s. One year later, Executive Life was declared 
insolvent. See DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Gilson (1994) for details of the Executive Life failure. 
7. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994) question whether the growth of 401(k) plans represents net 
new savings or merely substitutes for traditional, defined benefit pension plans. Eisner (1996) 
examines U.S. Census Bureau data and concludes that individuals have not substituted 401(k) wealth 
for wealth previously held in defined benefit and other pension plans. Papke (1999) provides 
evidence that employers sometimes introduce 401(k) plans as substitutes for defined benefit plans, 
but generally finds this not to be the case. 
8. In August 1992, the Financial Accounting Standards Board ruled, in FAS 110, that defined 
benefit plans would no longer be allowed to report GIC holdings at book values. Concern voiced in the 
financial press by GIC managers, insurers, and the pension industry about this ruling indicates the 
perceived worth of book value reporting (see, e.g., Geisel, 1991; Greenwald, 1991; and Williams, 1990). 
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Altman, 1992; Asquith, Mullins, and Wolff, 1989). Temporary mispricing of junk bonds 
during the first half of the 1980s should have increased incentives for managers already 
prone toward asset substitution to more actively pursue this policy. 
 
 




Our primary research hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is: 
 
Of the life insurers that issued GICs, managers of stock companies 
were more likely than managers of mutual or mutual-owned stock 
firms to accumulate higher risk investments, consistent with asset 
substitution strategies.  
 
We condition our hypothesis on participation in GIC markets because, for the 
reasons discussed earlier, we believe these insurers had particular opportunities to 
profit via asset substitution during the 1980s.  
Because the managerial discretion hypothesis indicates that mutual managers will 
tend to pursue actuarially predictable activities, one must question why mutual insurers 
offered GIC products at all. We suspect that, as with managers of stock insurers, mutual 
managers initially recognized opportunities to capitalize on their reputations and 
expertise in the pension marketplace to offer profitable new GIC products. As 
competition flourished in the 1980s, the spreads between GIC rates and underlying asset 
yields probably narrowed, yet many mutuals continued to offer GICs at competitive 




Because market valuation of insurer asset portfolio risk is not publicly available, 
we use annual statement values of different asset categories, as percentages of total 
invested assets, to measure risk in a manner similar to Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997). 
While their analysis is limited to relative holdings of common stocks, our proxy for 
asset portfolio risk is the ratio of common stocks plus below-investment-grade bonds 
to the total value of the insurer’s investment portfolio.9  
 
                                            
9. We do not adjust our measure of portfolio risk for derivatives or off-balance-sheet 
instruments (for discussion of these assets see, e.g., Cummins, Phillips, and Smith, 1997). These data 
were not publicly available from the NAIC until 2001. Even if the data were available, assessing the 
actual value by which to reduce the underlying asset values is problematic. For instance, the value of 
a call option generally is far from a dollar-for-dollar hedge against market changes in the underlying 
stock unless the call is in-the-money and near expiration.  
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Organizational Form Variables 
 
We investigate differences between stock and mutual insurers. We expect that 
stock insurers will have higher risk asset portfolios than mutual insurers in the late 
1980s because managers of stock insurers have both greater discretion over 
investment policy and greater incentives to substitute assets, and because of the 
previously mentioned specific conditions characteristic to the 1980s. We also attempt 
to add to the discussion about whether mutual-owned stock (MOS) insurers act more 
like mutual or stock firms. MOS insurers are stock insurers for which mutual insurers 
hold most of the outstanding equity. Mayers and Smith (1994) argue that MOS and 
mutual insurers have similar operating characteristics, and so should exhibit similar 
behavior. However, Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) find that managers of MOS 
insurers act more like stock insurers by actively engaging in asset substitution in 





We include this variable, which reflects the extent to which the insurer is issuing 
GIC products, so that we can interact it with our organizational form variables. 
Cummins, Phillips, and Tennyson (2001) interact dummy and non-dummy variables 
in their regression models, and this method is described in more detail in Wooldridge 
(2003, pp. 233-234). For example, in a regression with a stock dummy and a stock 
dummy*GIC liabilities interaction term, the coefficient on the stock dummy measures 
the difference in intercepts between stock and mutual firms, while the coefficient on 
the interaction term indicates the difference in the slopes—that is, in the rate of 
change in asset portfolio risk taken on as GIC volume increases. Specifically, the 
significance of the interaction term indicates whether changes in GIC volume affect 
asset portfolio risk differently for stock and mutual insurers. For example, assume that 
the coefficient on the stock dummy is significantly positive. The interaction term 
provides a deeper understanding as follows.  
A significantly negative coefficient on the interaction term implies that asset 
portfolio risk is higher for stock firms at lower levels of GIC volume, but the slope is 
greater for mutual firms. So at some higher GIC volume, asset portfolio risk for 
mutual insurers becomes higher than for stock insurers. If the coefficient on the 
interaction term is not significant, the slopes are the same. If the coefficient on the 
interaction term is significantly positive, the interpretation is that asset portfolio risk is 
higher for stock insurers than for mutual insurers at all levels of GIC volume, and that 
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We control for a variety of factors that should influence managers’ investment 
decisions. Our rationales and proxies for these variables follow. 
  
Firm Size  
Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (1997) state that economies of scale in information 
and transaction costs are likely in the market for risky investments. This should include 
stock investments and, especially, the more thinly traded junk bonds. We therefore 
anticipate a positive association between size and higher risk investment holdings. Our 
proxy for firm size is the natural logarithm of the insurer’s admitted assets. 
 
Leverage 
Managers’ incentives to engage in asset substitution can increase with the 
proportion of fixed claims in the firm’s capital structure (Gavish and Kalay, 1983; 
Green and Talmor, 1986). On the other hand, Cummins and Sommer (1996) suggest 
that a negative relation can be expected because insurers with greater capital are more 
likely to accept portfolio risk as they target their preferred solvency levels. Given the 
rationale and supporting empirical evidence of Cummins and Sommer, we anticipate a 
negative relation between leverage and asset portfolio risk. Our leverage proxy is the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Because market values for insurer liabilities are 
not directly observable, we use book values to ensure adequate sample size and for 
comparability across stock and mutual forms. 
One can argue that managers may simultaneously make decisions about both the 
amount of GICs or similar liabilities and the amount of investment risk they will 
accept with the assets generated by these new issues. To address such a potential 
problem, Greene (2003) and Kennedy (2003) suggest the use of a lagged dependent 
variable. We consequently implement a one-period lag for our leverage variable.  
 
Observable Risk  
Campbell and Kracaw (1990) demonstrate that observable financial risk is likely 
to be positively related to the unobservable risk of asset substitution by managers. In 
essence, managers of firms with a high level of observable financial risk have greater 
incentives to transfer wealth from fixed claimants to residual claimants, and they can 
do so via asset substitution.  
Our ex ante proxy for observable risk is a relative measure of the Insurance 
Regulatory Information System (IRIS) ratios falling outside guideline ranges set by 
the NAIC as of the end of the previous year. We expect a positive relation with asset 
portfolio risk. The IRIS ratios are used by insurance regulators as an initial screening 
device to classify insurers in terms of potential insolvency. Klein and Barth (1995) 
and Grace, Harrington, and Klein (1998b) note that researchers have raised various 
criticisms regarding the effectiveness of IRIS, but the latter researchers find that the 
proposed alternative systems developed by critics are not clearly more effective than 
IRIS. The NAIC now uses the IRIS ratios to classify insurers in terms of solvency risk 
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before applying a more dynamic system known as Financial Analysis Solvency 
Tracking (FAST) to improve risk classification. The FAST system is not available to 
the public, however. Grace, Harrington, and Klein (1998a) show that IRIS ratios 
remain effective as an initial screening device for predicting insolvency.  
 
Reinsurance Ceded 
Campbell and Kracaw (1990) posit that when managers with residual claims 
engage in costly hedging of observable risk, they signal their intentions to not increase 
unobservable risk through asset substitution. For insurers, the most visible form of 
risk hedging is through reinsurance cessions. We therefore predict a negative relation 
between net reinsurance ceded, as quantified by Mayers and Smith (1990), and asset 
portfolio risk for firms with equity claims outstanding.  
 
Regulatory Environment 
A commonly expressed goal of state regulators is to protect fixed claimants, 
especially policyholders, by monitoring the solvency of insurers licensed to do 
business in their states. While regulators have their own agendas, they also have 
incentives to monitor insurer solvency because of the political and economic costs of 
failures during their terms in office. We expect insurers subject to relatively strict 
regulation to be less prone to substitute assets. Following previous researchers (e.g., 
Boose, 1990; Wells, Cox, and Gaver, 1995; and Krishnaswami and Pottier, 2001), we 
use a binary variable for New York regulation as our proxy for stringent regulatory 
oversight.10 The New York insurance department is known for both rigorous 
regulation and enforcement of extraterritorial rules.11 
 
Separate Accounts 
Regulators require separate investment accounts to be maintained for certain lines 
of insurance, such as variable life or variable annuities. Assets backing these 
obligations are included in a separate statement and are marked to market. Because 
separate accounts facilitate monitoring by fixed claimants, we expect the ratio of 
separate account assets to total assets to be inversely related to holdings of higher risk 
investments.  
                                            
10. Although researchers commonly apply New York regulation as a control variable 
potentially affecting various insurer activities, Pottier and Sommer (1998) suggest that insurer 
licensing in New York could be a function of broadly defined lines of business. For our sample, 
potential endogeneity of the regulatory variable simply is not a factor, however. Running our model 
with and without the regulation variable generates virtually no differences in the coefficients of the 
other independent variables or goodness of fit. We choose to report the results for this variable 
because it is so commonly tested, however.  
11. The rigor of New York regulators is demonstrated by the full recovery of promised benefits 
to policyholders of Executive Life of New York in 1993 after the parent company, First Executive, 
failed. In contrast, policyholders of Executive Life of California still were awaiting settlement of 
claims in 1995. In retrospect, the former insurance commissioner of California characterized the New 
York department's efforts as “very aggressive” compared to his own department's “lax” approach to 
Executive Life’s financial problems (Geisel, 1992). 
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Managers of insurers that are affiliated with insurer groups generally have greater 
freedom to accept portfolio risk because it ostensibly can be reduced via 
diversification by the holding company. If so, we can expect a positive relation 
between group affiliation and asset portfolio risk. We apply a binary variable based 







Our primary data source is the NAIC InfoPro database for life and health 
insurers. We selected 1989 as our base year because the junk bond market began a 
rapid decline shortly thereafter. We also analyzed data for 1998, choosing that year 
because it is distant enough that conditions conducive to asset substitution in the 
1980s should have disappeared because of regulatory changes and the natural 
absorption of information by the markets. We also had hard copies of annual 
statements for spot-checking purposes.12  
We gathered data on GIC and non-GIC issuers with the goal of using both in a 
Heckman two-stage procedure as described later. We started with the NAIC database, 
which contains the universe of life and health insurers licensed in the U.S. The 1989 
NAIC database had 1,938 life and health insurers and among these, 125 reported 
positive guaranteed interest contract liabilities. Guaranteed interest contracts include 
GICs purchased by pension plan sponsors and some fixed-rate, single-premium 
deferred annuities purchased by individual investors. Following Walker (1992), we 
use this data item as our screen for identifying GIC issuers.  
GICs normally are written in denominations of $500,000 or more, and contracts 
seldom expire simultaneously on the financial statement date. We therefore omit 13 
insurers with GIC liabilities of less than $250,000 from our 1989 data. This group 
includes 12 stock insurers with median assets of less than $12 million and one mutual 
insurer. We also drop 12 foreign-owned insurers and subsidiaries because of unique 
organizational or accounting structures that could cause double counting. We then 
eliminate three insurers that exclusively write reinsurance for other life insurers, and 
two insurers with inadequate data. Our final sample includes 95 GIC issuers, and all 
have assets of $100 million or greater. For non-GIC issuers in the NAIC data, we use 
relevant screens identical to those applied to the GIC sample and eliminate firms with 
total assets less than $100 million, resulting in a final sample of 416 non-issuers. 
 
 
                                            
12. The NAIC database format changes from year to year, reflecting changes in the reporting 
forms required of insurers so that rigorous checks against hard copies of insurers’ annual statements 
are necessary. 
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Based on Best’s Insurance Reports 1990 Life-Health edition, our sample of 95 
GIC issuers includes 31 mutual firms, 53 stock companies, and 11 MOS firms. The 
mutual parents controlled at least 95% of the stock of the MOS insurers. Our final 
sample of 416 non-issuers encompasses 51 mutual, 315 stock, and 50 MOS firms. We 





We initially apply the following regression model to our sample of 95 life 
insurers with GICs outstanding in 1989: 
 
APRISK  =  γ0  + γ1STKDUM + γ2MOSDUM + γ3GICLIAB + γ4STKDUM * 
GICLIAB + γ5MOSDUM * GICLIAB + γ6LNSIZE + γ7LNSIZE + 
γ8LAGLEVER  + γ9OBRISK + γ10REINS + γ11REG_NY + 




APRISK = asset portfolio risk measure (ratio of common stocks plus 
below-investment-grade bonds to total portfolio assets) 
STKDUM = stock organizational form (stock=1, mutual=0) 
MOSDUM  = mutual-owned stock organization form (yes=1, no=0) 
GICLIAB = guaranteed investment contract liabilities divided by total 
assets (in percent) 
LNSIZE  = natural logarithm of insurer's admitted assets 
LAGLEVER = ratio of total liabilities to total assets lagged one period 
OBRISK = observable risk, represented by the ratio of the number of 
Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) ratios 
outside the NAIC-specified range to total IRIS ratios (12) 
REINS  = ratio of reinsurance ceded to the sum of direct premiums 
written plus reinsurance assumed 
REG_NY = licensed in state of New York (yes=1, no=0) 
SEPACCT = ratio of separate account assets to total assets 
AFFIL  = insurer is affiliated with other insurers through a holding 
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In our regression specification, we omit mutual insurers, meaning that the 
coefficients on the STKDUM and MOSDUM results are relative to mutual insurers. 
We expect a significantly positive coefficient for the STKDUM results. A 
significantly positive coefficient for MOSDUM would indicate that MOS insurers 
behave more like stock firms in agreement with Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997). An 
insignificant coefficient for MOSDUM would provide evidence that MOS insurers 
behave more like mutual firms in agreement with Mayers and Smith (1994). 
Selection bias could be an issue in using only the insurers with outstanding GICs. 
We investigate the selection bias issue by applying Heckman’s (1979) two-stage 
regression method.13  This method uses all insurers, both GIC and non-GIC issuers, in 
the first stage and generates a factor that is used in the second stage to correct for 
selection bias. If the correction factor (rho) is significant in the second stage, we will 
use the Heckman results. An insignificant rho in the second stages would indicate that 








Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our sample of life insurers. The median 
tests indicate a significant relation between GIC issuance and holdings of higher risk 













                                            
 13. We use the Heckman procedure because managers first select into or out of the cohort of 
insurers that issue GICs. Once this decision is made, managers must make decisions in a different 
dimension—i.e. the level of asset portfolio risk to accept. Much has been written about handling 
selection bias. The Heckman procedure has been criticized by some observers, especially when 
applied to small samples (Kennedy, 2003). We follow the Heckman approach because our samples 
are relatively large, and Greene (2003) posits that this method normally is applied when selection 
bias is possible.  
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GICLIAB 15.74 14.15  10.70 2.46 Sig. 
a APRISK = stock and below-investment-grade bond holdings divided by total assets (in percent); LNSIZE 
= natural logarithm of the insurer’s admitted assets; LAGLEVER = total liabilities (total assets − surplus) 
divided by total assets (in percent) for 1988; OBRISK = number of Insurance Regulatory Information 
System (IRIS) ratios outside the ranges deemed satisfactory by the NAIC; SEPACCT = separate account 
assets divided by total assets (in percent); and GICLIAB = guaranteed investment contract liabilities 
divided by total assets (in percent). 
b Sig. indicates median test for differences between mutual and stock insurers is significant at the 5% level. 
Not Sig. indicates no significant differences between mutual and stock insurers. 
c Sig. indicates median test for differences between GIC issuers and non-issuers is significant at the 5% 
level. Not Sig. indicates no significant differences between GIC issuers and non-issuers. 
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Both stock and mutual GIC issuers are larger and more highly leveraged than are 
the non-issuers. This suggests that the larger insurers with established reputations are 
more likely to enter the GIC markets. Despite significantly different leverage between 
GIC issuers and nonissuers, our observable risk proxy is not significantly different for 
the two samples. GIC issuers did have larger separate account liabilities, although the 
difference in magnitude was relatively small for stock insurers. 
While stock GIC issuers generally held greater proportions of higher risk assets 
than their mutual counterparts, the difference was not significant. The results in Table 
1 also reveal that the mutual GIC issuers were larger than stock GIC issuers, and they 
had issued both more fixed claims and separate account contracts. Our multivariate 
results, discussed later, address the mitigating impact of these factors with respect to 
organizational form. 
Table 2 shows the correlation analysis of the proxies for the independent 
variables in our model. The only correlation above 0.5 is between leverage and size 
(0.54). We also compute the variance inflation factors (VIFs) developed by Belsley, 
Kuh, and Welsch (1980), and find that all fall below 2.0, except for size, with VIF = 
2.48. Collinearity is likely not a problem if all VIFs are below 10.  
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 Regression Results 
 
When we implement the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure, we find that the 
correction factor (rho) is not significant (p-value: 0.79) in the second stage, indicating 
that selection bias is not a problem. Consequently, we report only OLS regressions 
using only the GIC issuers. In Table 3 we compare results for our samples of GIC 




Regression Results for Large Life and Health Insurers with  
Guaranteed Investment Contracts Outstanding 
 
Dependent Variable = APRISK 
  Expected Dependent Variable = APRISK 
  Sign (1989) 1989 (n=95) 1998 (n=78) 
  Coeff. Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept n/a 23.99 0.20 29.50 0.04** 
STKDUM + 6.31 0.02** 0.50 0.82 
MOSDUM +/insig -6.49 0.11 -3.97 0.16 
GICLIAB + 0.14 0.12 0.28 0.16 
STKDUM*GICLIAB + 0.14 0.03** -0.30 0.16 
MOSDUM*GICLIAB – 0.18 0.76 -0.15 0.62 
LNSIZE + 1.44 0.09* 1.03 0.08* 
LAGLEVER – -0.46 0.01** -0.52 <0.01*** 
OBRISK + 2.19 <0.01*** -0.41 0.61 
REINS – 3.40 0.33 -0.01 0.80 
REG_NY – 0.46 0.85 -1.22 0.48 
SEPACCT – -0.24 0.03** -0.16 <0.01*** 
AFFIL + 0.68 0.84 4.19 0.38 
Adj. R-squared  0.17  0.18  
F-statistic     <0.01***   0.01** 
STKDUM = 1 if insurer is a stock company and 0 otherwise; MOSDUM = 1 if insurer is a stock company 
owned by a mutual insurer and 0 otherwise; GICLIAB = guaranteed investment contract liabilities divided by 
total assets (in percent).; LNSIZE = natural log of admitted assets; LAGLEVER = total liabilities (total assets – 
surplus) divided by total assets (in percent) for the period t-1; OBRISK = the number of Insurance Regulatory 
Information System (IRIS) ratios outside the ranges deemed satisfactory by the NAIC; REINS = reinsurance 
ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed; REG_NY = 1 if insurer is 
licensed in New York and 0 otherwise; SEPACCT = separate account assets divided by total assets (in percent); 
and AFFIL = 1 if insurer has a group affiliation and 0 otherwise. 
* p-value < 0.10                 ** p-value < 0.05                     *** p-value < 0.01 
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Results for GIC Issuers – Organizational Form Variables 
The 1989 results show that the stock organizational form is positively and 
significantly related to asset portfolio risk at the 5% level, which supports our primary 
hypothesis. On average, stock insurers issuing GICs maintained an incremental 
position in common stocks and junk bonds amounting to 4.3% of total assets held. 
This translates to an economically significant difference of over $105 million worth of 
higher risk assets per stock insurer. The STKDUM*GICLIAB interaction term is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. Along with the STKDUM results, this 
indicates that stock insurers were taking on more asset portfolio risk than mutual 
insurers at all levels of GIC volume, and that the gap increases as GIC volume 
increases. Overall, these results provide evidence that during the 1980s and among the 
insurers that issued GICs, stock companies were more prone to asset substitution—
that is, accumulating higher risk investments—than were mutual insurers. 
The 1989 MOS coefficient is negative but not significant. The MOSDUM * 
GICLIAB interaction term is not significant, indicating there is no significant difference 
between mutual and MOS insurers in the slopes—that is, in the rate of increase in asset 
portfolio risk taken on as GIC volume increases. Our results support the theory of 
Mayers and Smith (1994) that MOS insurers should behave more like mutual insurers 
than stock insurers in contrast to the empirical findings of Lee, Mayers, and Smith 
(1997). Even though MOS coefficient results are not significant, it is close to being 
negatively significant at the 10% level. Another interpretation of these results is weak 
evidence that MOS insurers are even more conservative than mutual insurers when it 
comes to higher risk investments. As discussed in Mayers and Smith (1994), fixed 
claimants, such as policyholders and investors, have virtually no power to remove 
managers of MOS insurers because they do not have the right to engage in proxy fights 
for control of the mutual firm that appoints managers. To control the high costs of this 
fixed claimant-management conflict, managers of MOS firms are likely to be given even 
less managerial discretion over activity choices than are mutual managers, which could 
explain why the coefficient on the MOS variable is negative and close to being 
significant. We also state a note of caution about the MOS results because there are only 
11 MOS insurers in our sample. 
By 1998, the unique conditions causing informational asymmetries should have 
dissipated as regulations changed (see, e.g., footnote 6), information about GICs and 
junk bonds was fully disseminated, and the demand for new pension products 
stabilized. The incentives for stock managers to issue GICs and accept relatively 
greater portfolio risk should have correspondingly evaporated. Our regression using 
the 1998 data indicates that the stock form variable is insignificant, so stock managers 
were not actively substituting assets by that time. The MOS coefficient remains 
negative and still insignificant, as in the 1989 results. 
In another regression, not reported in the tables, we combine the 1989 and 1998 
data for GIC issuers and control for structural change across time as described in 
Wooldridge (2003, p.431). In this test, we start with the regression model in equation 
(1), omit the interaction terms, and add a binary variable for the year 1998, plus we 
interact this variable with all the other variables. The coefficients for the 1998 dummy 
and for interaction for 1998 dummy and stock organizational form variables are both 
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negative and significant at the 10% level. This provides some evidence that after 
controlling for unobserved structural change (that is, change not reflected by the 
variables in the regression) between 1989 and 1998, stock firms issuing GICs in 1998 
did not take on as much asset risk as stock firms issuing GICs in 1989. These findings 
supply further support for our contention that stock managers were able to substitute 
assets in 1989, but that such a practice is not dynamically viable. 
 
Results for GIC Issuers – Control Variables 
In the 1989 results, size is positively related to higher risk investments as expected 
and significant at the 10% level, which is consistent with the economies of scale and 
transaction costs arguments. The 1989 results indicate a significantly negative relation 
between leverage and asset portfolio risk. These findings support the Cummins and 
Sommer (1996) hypothesis that managers of firms with higher capital levels are more 
likely to hold higher risk portfolios as they target their preferred solvency levels. The 
coefficient for observable risk is positive and significant at the 1% level, consistent with 
our expectation. The separate accounts factor is significantly negative at the 5% level, 
also as expected. This finding provides some support for our argument that fixed 
claimants can more effectively monitor separate accounts, thereby limiting managerial 
opportunities to engage in asset substitution through investment in higher risk assets.  
The coefficients for reinsurance activity, regulation, and group affiliation are not 
significant in 1989. The results for the regulatory variable could be at least partially 
attributable to the relatively crude proxy available to us.  
The results for 1998 are very consistent with those for 1989, as all but one of the 
previously significant control variables remain significant. The one exception is the 
observable risk coefficient, which indicates that managers of GIC issuers with observably 





Regulators, consumers, and investors are concerned about asset substitution that 
may be detrimental to various stakeholders. Under normal conditions, we would not 
expect insurer management to substitute higher risk assets without adverse effects on 
contracts and/or prices. Our analysis suggests that in the 1980s, a period notable for 
changes in pension and investment markets and lagging regulatory policies, managers 
were able to engage in this type of asset substitution. Future research should examine 
the subprime mortgage crisis and insurer holdings of those assets in the early part of 
the millennium.  
We posit that agency theory, in tandem with the managerial discretion hypothesis, 
provide a viable explanation of why some managers of GIC issuers shifted risk via 
asset substitution while others did not. Our results provide evidence that managers of 
stock firms issuing GICs were more likely to accept greater asset portfolio risk during 
the unique period of the late 1980s. Nearly a decade later, after regulatory policies 
were revised and market conditions stabilized, we find no evidence of asset 
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substitution by managers of stock insurers. Direct tests for the effects of changes in 
market conditions and regulatory policies remain outside the scope of this study, but 
impress us as likely topics for future research.  
A debate has centered around whether MOS form is more like the stock or mutual 
organizational form (Mayers and Smith, 1994; Lee, Mayers, and Smith, 1997). 
Agency theory indicates that the MOS form should at least partially mitigate 
managerial incentives to accept risk and, therefore, to substitute assets when market 
conditions allow. Our evidence suggests that MOS insurers behave more like mutual 
insurers, or perhaps are even marginally more conservative than mutual insurers.  
Our analysis and evidence suggests that the positive theory of insurance must be 
developed further to explain incentive structures or regulatory regimes that can 
prevent insurers from accumulating relatively risky asset portfolios when market 
conditions are conducive to asset substitution. This study has focused on insurer asset 
portfolio risk. Future studies should expand the investigation to insurer underwriting 
portfolio risk.  
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